We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. JEL classi…cation codes: D82, D86.
Introduction
Bilateral trade with private values is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that in any non-trivial buyer-seller problem with continuous valuations, full e¢ ciency cannot be attained. Also with discrete (…nite) valuations, for many parameter values the …rst-best outcome cannot be reached. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) show that with many objects (and valuations that are independent across objects) the problem disappears in the limit: the …rst-best outcome can be approached as the number of objects tends to in…nity. While their mechanism approaches the …rst best in the limit, for a …nite number of objects it is not the optimal one (not second best). 1 Cohn (2010) constructs a more elaborated mechanism which, although also not optimal, achieves exponential convergence to the …rst best, rather than polynomial as in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) . 2 This paper looks for second-best mechanisms, focusing on the case of binary valuations. We construct a set of mechanisms that spans the entire Pareto frontier of the buyer's and seller's ex ante gains from trade. These mechanisms share a simple structure. Objects which both agents are eager to trade (low value for the seller and high for the buyer) are traded. Objects which both agents are reluctant to trade (high value for the seller and low for the buyer) are not traded.
Objects with a mixed desire to trade are traded only if the reluctant agent announces that the number of (other) objects she is eager to trade is above some threshold. This threshold depends on the designer's objective function: the stronger the preference for an agent, the lower the threshold.
In the extreme case in which the designer's objective identi…es with the seller's, our mechanism becomes the monopolist's pro…t-maximizing one. Our results imply that the monopoly sells the …rst M goods at a price equal to the buyer's high valuation, while additional goods are discounted and sold at the buyer's low valuation (provided that the monopoly wishes to sell at that price).
The bene…ts of such "mixed bundling" -o¤ering a bundle of goods at a price lower than the sum of individual prices -have been studied in the literature on auctions and on monopolistic screening.
McAfee, McMillan and Winston (1989) show that a monopoly selling two goods can bene…t from bundling, at least in the case that the buyer's valuations are independent. Armstrong (2000) studies revenue-maximizing auctions for two goods. In the part of his analysis that deals (like this paper) with the i.i.d. and binary valuations case, he shows that a bidder announcing a high value for one object receives priority in the bidding for the other object. Avery and Hendershott (2000) study revenue-maximizing auctions for two objects, with one buyer interested in both and many buyers interested in only one object. They show that, for the multi-object buyer, the probability of receiving one object and the price paid for it may depend on the announced valuation for the other, leading sometimes to an ine¢ cient allocation. While all these papers deal with the case of two objects, our paper deals with an arbitrary number of objects. (Our problem remains tractable by the assumption that objects'valuations are i.i.d.) Our paper also di¤ers in that the uncertainty is double sided (except for Avery and Hendershott 2000, where the opportunity cost generated by the one-object bidders makes the uncertainty in the interaction between the seller and the multi-object buyer double-sided). Finally, we characterize the whole e¢ cient frontier of the trading problem, while the above papers focus only on the seller's preferred mechanism. 3 In a closely related paper, Fang and Norman (2008) show that bundling can also be bene…cial in the context of provisioning multiple public goods (when exclusion is allowed). They study a model with many potential users, whose willingness to pay is private information. After they report their types the government decides whether to produce each good, whether to exclude certain agents from using it, and how much to charge each agent. For the case of binary valuations, they characterize the optimal mechanism (with equal weights on all consumers). They show that as the number of agents grows without bounds: (1) either none or all of the public goods are provided, and (2) a user with a low valuation is excluded i¤ she announced low valuations too many times. There are strong mathematical connections between our paper and Fang and Norman's. However, their main result, regarding the exclusion rule, is not parallel to our main result. This is because the public-goods analogue to trade in the buyer-seller problem is provision, rather than exclusion.
In their survey of the vast literature on multidimensional screening, Rochet and Stole (2003) explain that such environments tend to be di¢ cult to solve when they lack an exogenous typeordering, i.e., when the set of binding IC constraints depends on the set of trading probabilities of the di¤erent objects (or quantities, in their general formulation). A related di¢ culty, they add, is that the IC conditions are frequently binding not only among adjacent types. In our model, the assumptions of symmetry across objects and of binary valuations give rise to a natural ordering of 3 Note that our problem is di¤erent from the standard monopolistic bundling model in that the monopoly's type is private information (in other words, the monopoly here is an "informed principal" -see Myerson 1983 and Maskin and Tirole 1990) . Moreover, and to its further advantage, the monopoly devises its optimal mechanism at the ex ante stage, and then both the buyer and the monopoly submit their reports to the mechanism.
types -according to the number of eager valuations. This ordering is not "exogenous" in Rochet and Stole's sense: whether the IC constraints between adjacent types are the only binding ones depends on the trading probabilities. Nonetheless, we solve for the optimal mechanism in a relaxed problem, in which IC is required to hold only between adjacent types relative to this ordering, and show that the optimal trading probabilities in the relaxed problem are monotone. This, in turn, implies that these constraints are the only binding ones in the 
The Model
Consider a private values buyer-seller problem with N objects, labeled i 2 I = f1; :::; N g. Each agent assigns one of two possible valuations to each object. To treat the two agents in a symmetric way, we denote the valuations of the buyer (b) by v b e > v b r > 0 ("e" stands for "eager" to trade the object, and "r" stands for "reluctant"); for the seller (s) the valuations are v s r > v s e 0.
We also denote the di¤erence between the valuations of agent j 2 fb; sg by j = v By the revelation principle (Myerson 1979) , we can restrict attention to incentive-compatible and direct mechanisms. Mechanism = p; t s ; t b speci…es, for each pair of announcements w s ; w b , a probability p i; w s ; w b of trade for each object i and a monetary transfer t j w s ; w b to agent j.
The utility of agent j of type w j who announcesŵ j , when the rival j announcesŵ j , is:
Under truth telling of j, the interim expected utility of agent j of type w j who announcesŵ j is:
where E w j denotes the expectation over all types of j. Agent j's ex ante utility (under truth telling) is:
where E w j is the expectation over all of j's types. Finally, the revenue of the mechanism is:
Optimal Mechanisms
For any pair of weights = s ; b (non-negative and summing to 1), an -optimal mechanism is one that maximizes the -weighted sum of the agents'ex ante utilities:
subject to the constraints:
A utility pair EU s ; EU b induced by an -optimal mechanism is called an -optimal outcome.
An -facet of the Pareto frontier is the set of all -optimal outcomes.
Our main result characterizes a set of simple mechanisms that spans the entire Pareto frontier:
Theorem 1 Any -optimal outcome can be achieved by a direct mechanism in which:
An object which both agents are eager to trade is traded with probability 1.
An object which both agents are reluctant to trade is traded with probability 0.
An object which agent j is eager to trade and agent j is reluctant to trade is traded with:
-probability 1, if the number of objects that j is eager to trade exceeds threshold M j ,
where M j 2 f0; :::; N g and 0 < j 1. Moreover, denoting by M j ( ) the set of all thresholds M j in mechanisms that generate an -facet of the Pareto frontier, the correspondence M j ( ) is weakly decreasing in j .
A constructive proof of the theorem is given in Section 4. The proof also shows how to compute M j , j and the payments to agents. We proceed by explaining the intuition of the result, and conclude with an application to bundling and consumer surplus in the special case of monopoly.
Intuition for Theorem 1
In a …rst-best solution, each object is traded whenever the buyer's valuation is higher than the seller's, i.e., as long as at least one agent is eager to trade. This outcome, however, is generally infeasible: for many parameter values, the information rents that are required to induce the agents to reveal their types and agree to participate are higher than the total surplus generated by trade, and thus budget balance is violated. To restore budget balancedness, the mechanism must restrict trade between some of the types, thereby reducing rent payments. Second-best optimality, then, requires to identify the most economical trade restrictions.
It is convenient to think of the mechanism as if it collects all the surplus from trades (temporarily leaving agents with zero net utilities) and uses it to pay the agents the required information rents.
These rents are then the agents'…nal payo¤s. The mechanism sets trade probabilities for each pair of types and each object. Increasing each of these probabilities induces (1) a change in the total surplus generated by the mechanism and (2) a change in the sum of required rents to other types of both agents. The di¤erence (2)-(1) is the budgetary cost of increasing that probability. The direct bene…t (change in the objective function) is the -weighted sum of the same induced rents.
A second-best mechanism prioritizes trades with lower ratios of budgetary cost to direct bene…t.
A priory, agents have an incentive to lie downwards: pretend to be eager to trade fewer objects, in order to obtain better trading prices. Rents are thus paid per object that the agent admits being eager to trade. The rent equals the expected gain from lying, which is proportional to the probability that the agent is allowed to trade after a "reluctant" report. There are thus two obvious cases with no trade-o¤ between the cost and the bene…t of trades: Whenever both agents are eager to trade an object there is no reason to restrict trade, since trade increases surplus without generating rent payments for other types. And, whenever both agents are reluctant, they should not trade -such trade decreases the surplus and only increases the incentive of other types to lie.
A tradeo¤ exists when one agent is eager to trade an object and the other is reluctant. Call the set of all the types of an agent, who have exactly m eager valuations, "level m". Allowing (all) level m types of one agent to trade objects they are reluctant to (when the other agent is eager to trade) necessitates rent payments to all the types at levels above m. These trades also generate a surplus, which is proportional to the number of types in level m times the number of reluctant valuations per type. Our key (and non-trivial) result is that the induced budgetary cost to direct bene…t ratio is decreasing in m. We thus obtain, for each agent j, a threshold M j such that levels above M j trade their reluctant objects and those below do not.
The thresholds for the two agents are the lowest integers for which the total rents do not exceed the surplus generated by the mechanism. 4 Since decreasing threshold M j increases j's rent, there is a trade-o¤ between the two thresholds. Recall that the objective function is the -weighted sum of the rents. Thus, threshold M j is (weakly) decreasing in j .
If j is su¢ ciently high, M j equals 0. Agent j is always allowed to trade, and trade restrictions apply to agent j only. As we further increase j , the -optimal mechanism picks an even higher M j , and pays the economized rent (minus the lost surplus) as a lump sum payment to j. 5
Monopoly and consumer surplus:
Consider the extreme case of s = 1 and b = 0. Here, the seller can be viewed as a monopolist who sets the mechanism in his best interest. If N is small, the monopolist sets M b = N , which implies that only objects which the buyer is eager to trade (high valuation) are traded, at the highest price he is willing to pay, v b e . Since there is no trade when the buyer is reluctant to trade, the buyer receives no rents at all. For large N , the monopolist sets M b < N , i.e., agrees to sell some of the objects at a price equal to the buyer's low valuation v b r (provided the monopoly has low cost, v s e , for these objects). In these cases, the buyer is paid a positive expected rent, i.e., ends up with a positive (expected) consumer surplus. This is formalized in the following proposition (proved in the appendix), which applies also to the opposite, monopsony case:
Proposition 1 Assume that j = 0. Then, in any -optimal mechanism, agent j has a strictly positive ex ante utility, or equivalently M j < N , if and only if N
4 The probability of trade at the threshold may be between 0 and 1 so that total surplus and rents are equated.
5 For some parameter values, a …rst-best solution (no trade restrictions) is feasible. Here, the total surplus exceeds the required rents, and both agents may receive lump sum payments. Note, however, that for a …rst-best solution, must be in a neighborhood of (0:5; 0:5). At extreme values of , the optimal solution must involve restricting trade (and reducing rents) for the agent with low j , in order to to increase the lump sum payment to the preferred agent.
Proof of Theorem 1
We start with a convenient decomposition of the transfers t j , into two parts:
This decomposition can be interpreted as follows. First, each agent gets paid (or pays) the left summand; as long as his announcement is truthful, this payment exactly compensates for the expected loss (or gain) from giving away (or receiving) the objects. Then, the agent is also paid a rent, j , implicitly de…ned by (2). Under truth-telling, this rent is in fact his net utility: denoting j w j = E w j j w j ; w j , we observe that U j (w j ; w j ) = j w j .
Since the agents are risk neutral and their types are independent, for any mechanism satisfying ex ante budget balance there exists a mechanism satisfying ex post budget balance with the same trading rule and same interim utilities to both agents (Proposition 2 in Borgers and Norman 2008).
We can thus replace the ex post budget-balance condition (BB) by its weaker ex ante counterpart:
For any type w j , we say that a reportŵ j is a a local downward deviation if there is exactly one object i 2 N such that w De…nition 1 A mechanism is LDIC if U j (w j ; w j ) U j w j ;ŵ j for any w j 2 W j and any local downward deviationŵ j of w j .
We proceed by looking for a LDIC-optimal mechanism: one that maximizes s EU s + b EU b subject to LDIC, IR and BB' (the …nal step of the proof shows that this mechanism satis…es, in fact, the full set of IC constraints). 6 We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In any LDIC-optimal mechanism, the probability of trade is 1 for objects which both agents are eager to trade, and 0 for objects which both agents are reluctant to trade. 7 6 For a closely related discussion, in the case of unidimensional trade, see Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) , pp. 78-80. 7 In fact, the proof can be easily adapted to show that the lemma also holds if "LDIC-optimal" is replaced by "X-optimal" where X is any subset of the IC conditions. Since our problem is symmetric across objects (each agent's valuations are i.i.d. across objects), we can restrict the search to the domain of symmetric mechanisms, which are agnostic to changing the names of the objects. Let : I ! I denote a permutation mapping, and let M denote the corresponding permutation operator on vectors, so that M w is a vector in which the i th element is Lemma 2 For any LDIC mechanism = p; s ; b there exists a symmetric LDIC mechanism = p;^ s ;^ b with the same ex ante utilities for the agents and revenue for the mechanism. 8
Let g w j denote the number of objects that type w j is eager to trade. In a symmetric mechanism , the rents s and b depend only on g (w s ) and g w b ; the probability of trade in object i, p i; w s ; w b , depends only on the valuations of the speci…c object, w s i and w b i , and on g (w s ) and g w b . We thus partition the set W j of all types of agent j to N + 1 disjoint sets A tight mechanism is one in which each type is exactly indi¤ erent to a local downward deviation:
De…nition 3 A mechanism is tight if U j (w j ; w j ) = U j w j ;ŵ j for any w j 2 W j and any local downward deviationŵ j of w j .
The search for optimal LDIC mechanisms can be further restricted to the smaller and more structured domain of tight and symmetric ones (TSLDIC):
Lemma 3 For any symmetric LDIC mechanism = p; s ; b there exists a TSLDIC mechanism = p;^ s ;^ b with the same ex ante utilities for the agents and revenue for the mechanism. 9
In a TSLDIC-optimal mechanism, the expected rent j of type w j;m is uniquely determined by the probabilities f and by c j , the rent of the lowest type w j;0 . Since w j;m+1 is exactly indi¤erent to a local downward deviation, w j;m+1 = w j;m + q j j m + (1 q j ) 0 j (recall that, by Lemma 1, if j is reluctant to trade object i, the probability of trade is 0). Thus:
for any m 2 f0; :::; N g; j 2 fb; sg. The ex ante utility of agent j is then:
where f BD is the p.d.f. of the binomial distribution. Let S denote the ex ante surplus generated by trade. The surplus comes from eager-eager and eager-reluctant encounters, and is given by: 
By (3), the IR constraint reduces to c j 0. Ex ante budget balance requires S ( )
In an optimal mechanism this condition must hold with equality (otherwise, a constant could be added to the payments of one agent, increasing his utility without violating IC).
For brevity of notation denote 
(If the denominator is 0 we de…ne r j m to be 1 or +1, according to the sign of the nominator.)
In an optimal solution of the linear program (4), To complete the proof we show that this mechanism is monotone and hence fully incentive compatible.
To de…ne monotonicity, we introduce the following notation. Given a symmetric mechanism , denote the probability that type w j;m trades an object with valuation v j 2 fv
That is, p j (v j ; m) = E w j p i; w j ; w j where w j 2 G j m and w j i = v j (this is well de…ned by symmetry). We say that is monotone if the probability to trade objects with eager valuations is always weakly higher the that of trading objects with a reluctant valuation, and if the probability to trade an object with a given valuation is weakly increasing in m: 1 is weakly increasing in m, and since p j (v j e ; k) = q j 1 + 1 q j j where j 0 is constant (the probability of trade depends only on the type of agent j who is reluctant to trade the object).
Lemma 6 A monotone and TSLDIC mechanism is incentive compatible.
Thus, the TSLDIC-optimal mechanism^ satis…es IC and is therefore -optimal.
Computation of the payments to the agents Given the trade probabilities described above, any payment scheme that provides type w j;m with the expected rent given in (3) completes the speci…cation of the mechanism. The simplest scheme …xes the payment to w j;m independently of j's type; plugging in M j and j , we obtain:
That is, the agent is paid j j q j for the …rst "eager" report above the threshold M j , and j q j for each of the others. Recall that the rents are translated back into payments t using (2).
Note that this simple speci…cation satis…es only the ex ante budget balance constraint. To re-obtain ex post budget balance, simply rede…ne the payments as follows:
where R w j ; w j is the revenue of the mechanism, as de…ned in (1).
Appendix : Proofs
Proof of the second part of Theorem 1: M j ( ) is decreasing in j . Consider anoptimal mechanism with thresholds M s ( ) ; M b ( ) and an^ -optimal mechanism with thresholds for each agent j (i) The utility from reporting any type other thanŵ j (either truthfully or not) is unchanged; (ii) For typeŵ j , the utility from reporting truthfully is unchanged; (iii) For any typew j 6 =ŵ j , the expected utility from pretending to beŵ j is weakly lower (same ifw
and strictly lower ifw
The ex ante surplus of the mechanism is, however, increased by
v s e , where prob(ŵ j ) is the prior probability that agent j is of typeŵ j . This additional surplus can be transferred to one of the agents (as a lump sum, so that incentives are una¤ected), contradicting the optimality of . Since the prior probability of having at least k + 1 eager valuations is 1 F BD k; N; q j , the mechanism's ex ante revenue and the agents'ex ante utilities are the same as under . Moreover, If^ is TSLDIC -we are done, otherwise -repeat the process of eliminating a non-binding constraint (…nitely many times) until the mechanism is tight. 
l is such that the budget constraint is satis…ed, that is, 
which is a contradiction to the optimality of s ; b .
Lemma 5. For m 0, the numerator of r , and multiply both sides by (n k ) (n k) to get:
p k+j pk pk +j p k .
Letk > k. Since each of the terms in the numerator of the RHS is larger than the corresponding term in the denominator, then p k+j pk pk +j p k n k n k > 1 or, equivalently,
Thus,
, and therefore also
. Recall that F BD (k; N; q) = 1 P i=k i=0 p i , and therefore: (n k) f BD (k;N;q) 1 F BD(k;N;q) < (n k ) f BD (k;N;q) 1 F BD(k;N;q) . Lemma 6. Consider two di¤erent types w j;m andŵ j;m+k where k 0. In a TSLDIC mechanism, 1 2 An alternative proof of this lemma, using Lagrange-multipliers, is available upon request from the authors. 
